Andijan

EU Misses Opportunity to Make Solid step towards the

Creation of a Coherent Foreign Policy

Since the fall of the USSR in 1990, many of the southern former Republics have been overlooked by the global media, as Central Asia was deemed to be among the most remote and irrelevant of regions. This outlook was altered briefly after the attacks of 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, as officials recognized that air bases in the Central Asian republics would be pivotal outposts on this war on terror. However, as the ongoing battles in Afghanistan have all but slipped from the headlines, Central Asian nations have once again slithered under the radar despite the May massacre in Andijan, which The Economist labeled the "worst committed by a government against demonstrators since Tianenmen in 1989." Even the expulsion of American troops by the Uzbek strongman Islam Karimov went largely unnoticed by Western media and its leaders.

Allowing Uzbekistan a free ride on the basis of its obscurity is a mistake made by the entire international community, but especially for the European Union. After the May Andijan massacre, which observers estimate saw the violent deaths of 500 to 1,000 peaceful protesters, Western nations called for the need for an independent UN inquiry, but went no further in condemning the Uzbek regime. The U.S., unwilling to ruffle the feathers of an unfriendly ruler and eager to maintain its air base in Khanabad, stopped short of publicly condemning Karimov's actions. Putin, eager to cultivate closer relations with Uzbekistan, and no fan of peaceful demonstrations in its neighboring republics, remained silent. Thus, the Andijan massacre provided a prime opportunity for the EU to flex its foreign policy muscles and present a united front to the world in castigating Karimov for his abuses. The EU chose to let this opportunity pass.

To be sure, it can be argued that the EU was the sole political entity to impose any punitory measures on Uzbekistan as a rejoinder for its blatant infraction of human rights. However, the sanctions that were eventually imposed on this rogue state were much-delayed by petty infighting amongst key players in the EU, who should have been more focused on transforming these unfortunate events in Uzbekistan into a unifying call for the protection of human rights worldwide, thereby cementing a pillar of future European foreign policy. Instead, what the EU delivered was a dilatory arms embargo on the country, formally approved on 3 October 2005, five months after the massacre.

Initiating a diplomatic campaign against Karimov's abuses could have been an ideal training ground on which to test the EU’s foreign policy legs. Conducting such a campaign posed no real threat to Europe's interests: Uzbekistan's trading partners are its neighbors, Russia, and China, so no economic fallout would have occurred. The chances of Uzbekistan becoming a candidate for EU accession are practically nonexistent, therefore the EU, by demanding democratization, would not have been instigating a wave of immigration that it could not sustain; and, most importantly, tangling with Uzbekistan would have been far less damaging and divisive than engaging in an angry diplomatic war with a larger superpower, as it has thus far with the United States.

This delay, coupled with the dearth of retribution from other nations, only reinforced what Karimov already believed to be true: that the international community would effectively turn a blind eye to all abuses of power in Uzbekistan, because of its perceived unimportance in global affairs. These actions belie a darker truth: Western nations have not yet learned the dangers of ignoring a pariah state, a policy direction which only just recently contributed to rise of the Taliban regime and the pursuant terrorist attacks of 9/11. This also marks a lost opportunity to prove to the skeptical Muslim world that the "Global War on Terror" is not a carte blanche for authoritarian figures to blight legitimate democratic movements, with the tacit support of the developed world.

It is not too late to increase international pressure on Uzbekistan in retaliation of its barbarous attacks on its own people. The OSCE is now conducting an inquiry into the Andijan affair, and the UN has already expressed its misgivings over the recent trials of Uzbeks who are charged with inciting the rebellion. If the EU wishes to be perceived as a key player in international affairs, it would do well to seize this opportunity and demand the observance of human rights in Uzbekistan. Such a galvanizing cry could be the unifying force needed to set European foreign policy on the path of consensus.